Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was followed by sanction packages targeting state-controlled Russian media platforms. Several Balkan countries—including Kosovo and Albania—decided to block access to Kremlin-controlled outlets, however Kremlin’s information tactics have continued to penetrate the region, with disinformation now reaching audiences through alternative channels.
Kosovo and Albania remain among the most pro-NATO and pro-EU states in the region, meaning a rapid shift in geopolitical orientation is unlikely. However, Russian disinformation can still reshape public perception about other international issues.
“If over 50% of Ukraine-related news has unidentifiable sources, this means our citizens are being served an alternative reality. We have also discovered partial translations of international media—such as Gardam—where Albanian versions contain only Kremlin-aligned messaging, excluding other perspectives,” explained Visar Prebreza, editor at the fact-checking platform Krypometri.
He notes that disinformation has already shaped public opinion on several domestic issues.
In Albania, experts say citizens remain poorly prepared to detect sophisticated disinformation patterns.
“Public polarization becomes the backbone of these disinformation platforms. That is worrying because such narratives can influence perceptions about institutions, national policies, or relations with international allies,” stated Isa Myzyraj, Executive Director of the Albanian Journalists’ Association.
Likewise, Dren Gërguri, journalism professor at the University of Prishtina stressed that the lack of media literacy leaves the public unprotected.
“The absence of verification culture, the failure to consult multiple sources for the same information, and media outlets prioritizing economic interests over public interest all facilitate the spread of false narratives. Domestic political polarization makes the public even more vulnerable,” he argued.
A 2023 BIRN investigation documented how Kremlin’s official statements containing disinformation about Kosovo, were being republished by several Kosovo-based media without any editorial intervention. The investigation did not find evidence of direct Russian state funding behind this content distribution, but argued that such channels became influential after the Government of Kosovo blocked access to Sputnik and Russia Today.
Two years later, Pravda, another platform known for spreading disinformation in more than 80 countries and different languages, has published 33 articles in Albanian about Kosovo, most of them pushing disinformation narratives about events in Kosovo and Albania.
Unidentifiable sources of information
Illustration: BIRN/Igor Vujcic
After February 24, 2022, Kosovo and Albania imposed sanctions on Kremlin-controlled media, including bans on online and audiovisual transmission. Yet a research by the media monitoring company PIKASA, which reviewed content published during the early stages of the war in Ukraine, uncovered a sophisticated disinformation-distribution pattern.
More than 51% of Ukraine-related news published in Kosovo and Albania lacked identifiable sources. Most of the monitored outlets produced content relying on sources potentially linked to Russian information ecosystems.
“Most of the fake news that reaches Albania from third parties—what we call ‘foreign information manipulation and interference,’ FIMI—comes from Russian state-controlled media (RT, Tass, etc.) and Serbian media, such as Kurir, Danas, Blic, B92, Pink. These narratives then appear on Albanian-language portals such as KosovoOnline and Pravda, as well as widely on social media,” said Nevila Gjata, Editor-in-Chief of the Tirana based fact-checking platform Faktoje.al.
“In Albania, the Pravda platform was identified last year by the head of the Special Parliamentary Committee Against Disinformation, Erion Braçe, as a source of Russian disinformation. The Albanian Electronic and Postal Communications Authority, AKEP,reported shutting down around 157 ‘.ru’ domains by November 2024, including albania.news-pravda.com,” she added.
According to Alen Musaefendic, Senior Analyst at the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, Balkan audiences are already oversaturated with Russian disinformation content.
“The biggest risk from RT Balkan and Sputnik Serbia is not only that they spread pro-Kremlin narratives—the market is already flooded—but that they provide free content to a struggling media industry,” Musaefendic explained, adding that small portals republish this content to generate clicks and profit.
In Kosovo, researchers have documented even more extreme forms of manipulation, where ordinary traffic accidents were framed as “attacks.”
“The goal is not only to spread positive narratives about Russia, but also to undermine trust in our institutions and especially in our strategic ties with the US and EU. Take yesterday’s traffic incident with KFOR units whereas Pravda described it as ‘an attack on a Kosovo traffic officer,’ a distorted narrative aimed at provoking confusion and tension,” said Jeton Mehmeti, former chair of Kosovo’s Independent Media Commission and professor at RIT Kosovo.
Tackling disinformation in Albania as Kosovo stands still
A person scrolls the screen of a mobile phone. Illustration: EPA-EFE/HARISH TYAGI
In July 2025, the Albanian Parliament approved a national anti-disinformation strategy, without the opposition’s votes.
Its four key objectives include strengthening institutional capacities to prevent foreign interference in elections; protecting national security through deeper cooperation with NATO, the EU, and allies; safeguarding the national economy and critical sectors from hostile foreign financing and protecting freedom of expression and strengthening investigative journalism.
Meanwhile, the Government’s approach has been criticized for its lack of transparency.
“The document contains important objectives, but the approval process lacked transparency and political consensus. Many measures remain only on paper. Instead of vague instruments that could endanger critical media, we need clear monitoring mechanisms, regular public reporting, and genuine cooperation with journalists and civil society,” explains Lorin Kadriu, Director at Citizens Channel.
Fact-checkers also argue that measures must be continuous and effectively enforced.
“Efforts to tackle disinformation must be coordinated and sustainable. The fact that Pravda still operates in Albania despite being shut down once shows that fragmented, symbolic measures—often taken only when the issue becomes publicly sensitive—are not enough,” says Nevila Gjata from Faktoje.
Unlike Albania, Kosovo has taken no steps toward drafting a national plan against disinformation. Despite the repeated calls from Civil Society and other actors, the Government of Kosovo has not drafted a media-literacy strategy.
Mehmeti said that, “to protect ourselves from such disinformation, coordinated efforts are needed between educational institutions and professional media. Credible media must remain citizens’ primary source of information—not dubious propaganda platforms like Pravda.”
Fitim Gashi, from Kosovo based media outlet Sbunker, added that the relevant regulators as independent institutions, “should perhaps consider expanding the ban list for platforms that distribute pro-Russian narratives in Kosovo, such as Pravda.”
However, Prebreza highlighted a lack of institutional readiness in Kosovo.
“Public discourse often discusses Kremlin influence, but when you meet the officials responsible for dealing with this issue, it becomes clear that they have no strategic plan. Recently, we delivered basic training for 80 institutional representatives to help them build fundamental skills in tracking disinformation,” he stated
Merxhan Curri contributed to this article.