Kosovo’s justice system has become a target of disinformation campaigns, but remains largely unprepared to confront them which undermines public trust and exposes deep institutional vulnerabilities.
Disinformation has become a powerful weapon against democratic institutions, undermining trust, distorting public opinion, and weakening accountability. In fragile democracies where trust in the state is limited, these narratives can cause deep institutional harm. Kosovo’s justice system has become one of the main targets of such campaigns.
A BIRN investigation identified dozens of disinformation narratives targeting the country’s judiciary. Between September and December in 2024 alone, BIRN’s fact-checking platform, which monitors the justice system, uncovered more than 60 false news stories connected to courts and prosecution offices. Other findings showed that staff working within the system lacked the capacity to identify the sources of these disinformation efforts.
The problem was laid out in a social experiment conducted by BIRN in 2023.The experiment involved giving 10 judges and 10 prosecutors a fabricated news story and asking them whether they believed it and if they would share it with others. Half of the judges and 60 percent of the prosecutors said they trusted the information and failed to recognise the story as false even though it was professionally relevant to them.
This lack of preparedness, researchers concluded, is weakening public trust in the system itself.
Kreshnik Gashi, editor-in-chief of Kallxo.com, a fact-checking platform certified by IFCN, emphasises the damage disinformation has inflicted on Kosovo’s justice system.
“It is clear that disinformation narratives are designed to discourage witnesses from cooperating with prosecutors and to demotivate citizens from pursuing cases in the courts,” Gashi explains.
According to him, fact-checking has revealed misleading reports not only about individual judges but also about the performance of the judiciary as a whole.
“The simplest example is the trial of Glauk Konjufca, the former Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly. He was acquitted due to lack of evidence in a tear gas case. Yet, in the media and on social networks, images circulated of him throwing tear gas. What most outlets failed to verify was that Konjufca was not indicted for the incident shown in those images, but for another case entirely,” Gashi clarifies.
He explains that the indictment against Konjufca was not related to tear gas thrown in the main Assembly chamber—where there were cameras —but to an incident in a Presidential meeting room where no security cameras were present.
“The whole process was then used to promote false claims that Kosovo’s courts release defendants from charges even when there is visual evidence of them committing criminal acts,” says Gashi.
Narratives of disinformation
Illustration: BIRN/Igor Vujcic
The analysis of disinformation content reveals narratives suggesting impunity for crime, erosion of trust in judicial decisions, and efforts to discourage citizens from filing cases in courts or with prosecutors.
Responding to BIRN, the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, KPC, acknowledged that disinformation campaigns targeting prosecutors are ongoing and intentional.
“KPC has repeatedly been the target of organised disinformation campaigns. These campaigns aim to undermine the professional integrity of prosecutors and reduce public trust in Kosovo’s justice system,” the Council stated.
In recent years, indictments have been raised primarily against political figures accused of inciting hatred and threatening state prosecutors. The Special Prosecution of Kosovo also launched a major espionage investigation, identifying individuals with ties to Serbia’s intelligence services. These cases revealed attempts to erode credibility and trust in Kosovo’s institutions.
“These disinformation campaigns have emerged as attempts to influence investigations, shape public opinion in a biased way, and exert political and social pressure on justice institutions. Disinformation has been exploited as a tool to weaken institutional independence and protect particular individual or group interests,” the KPC emphasised.
Arbër Jashari, former spokesperson of the Court of Appeals and now a media law attorney, underlines that the justice system has long been a “scapegoat” for Kosovo’s problems.
According to him, politicians are especially eager to build narratives portraying courts and prosecutors as corrupt and dysfunctional in order to strip them of credibility and public trust.
“Politicians want to push a narrative of a corrupt and non-functional judiciary, particularly when court rulings do not align with their interests. Meanwhile, interest groups pursue such narratives for profit or to exert pressure, while individuals or other legal entities may be motivated by dissatisfaction with judicial decisions,” Jashari explains.
Limited capacities
Prishtina Basic Court. Photo: BIRN
Albert Zogaj, Chair of the Kosovo Judicial Council, says disinformation has fueled a damaging narrative about the judiciary.
“Disinformation has painted the justice system as corrupt, politicised, influenced, unprofessional, and ineffective,” he explains.
“Yet surveys show a big gap—citizens who have had cases in court report far greater satisfaction than those who have not. This suggests that the negative image, often reinforced by disinformation campaigns, does not fully reflect reality.”
According to Zogaj, the impact goes beyond public perception.
“These campaigns have severely harmed the judiciary as an institution and have undermined the personal integrity of the people working within it,” he says.
Despite these challenges, Kosovo’s judiciary is often cited as one of the most transparent in the region. Court verdicts are regularly published online, and media outlets are permitted to film inside courtrooms. But greater transparency has not translated into greater resilience against disinformation. Capacities to detect false narratives, conduct pre-debunking, or craft counter-narratives remain underdeveloped.
BIRN’s report, The History of Lies, found that most of Kosovo’s institutions lack the capacity to identify the sources of disinformation or to construct effective counter-narratives.
From a legal perspective, disinformation is addressed through civil legislation on defamation and insult. Court data show that the number of such lawsuits has increased, yet fewer than 50% of cases receive judicial resolution.
In Prishtina Basic Court, for example, more than 30 defamation and insult cases have been filed; 14 have received final judgments, while 16 remain pending. In Prizren, there are 27 such cases, with 11 resolved and 16 still in process. The Gjakova Basic Court registered 19 cases, resolving 8. In Peja, 30 cases were filed, of which 17 were resolved and 13 remain ongoing. Gjilan saw 17 cases, with 6 resolved and 11 still pending. Meanwhile, Ferizaj recorded 30 cases, with 14 resolved to date.
The data, covering the period from 2014 to 2023, indicate that Kosovo’s courts have managed to resolve just over 50 percent of all defamation and insult lawsuits filed in the system.