Serbia’s student movement, which emerged as civic resistance against corruption and nepotism, is feeding Kremlin-based disinformation campaigns about Kosovo after adopting a rhetoric on the country that analysts say echoes nationalist narratives.
On May 17, the Serbian student movement shared on X what it called a memorandum on Kosovo, describing Kosovo as an “inalienable and integral part of the Republic of Serbia” and as a matter of “personal and collective responsibility” and “historical debt to our ancestors and descendants.”
“This fact is not merely a constitutional category, but a historical and moral imperative that is not subject to negotiations on its substance,” the students wrote, adding that Kosovo is “not merely a territory” but “a component of Serbian national identity” and “a struggle for our honour, our culture, and our future.”
The students argue that preserving Serbia’s constitutional order in Kosovo represents “the foundation of the survival of the Serbian state.”
Serbian students have been protesting against Aleksandar Vucic’s rule since November 2024, after a part of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad collapsed and left 16 people dead.
Students’ protests have been praised as a progressive, civic challenge to Serbia’s ruling elite, and their corruption, nepotism, and chronic mismanagement of the country. However, the claims in the so-called “Memorandum on Kosovo” have sparked criticism from intellectuals and analysts in both Serbia and Kosovo, who argue that the movement has increasingly adopted nationalist rhetoric reminiscent of Serbia’s political discourse from the 1980s.
The memorandum, which excludes and ignores the reality on the ground in Kosovo for the past three decades, shows that the movement is now talking to a wider nationalist electorate.
Experts told Prishtina Insight that expecting any major Serbian political actor to abandon the country’s constitutional claim over Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008, remains unrealistic given both domestic politics and Serbia’s international backing from countries that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence.
Prishtina based sociologist and political analyst Artan Muhaxhiri drew comparisons between the students’ memorandum and the infamous 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, SANU, which portrayed Serbia as a victim of historical injustice and laid much of the ideological groundwork for Serbian nationalism during the Yugoslav wars.
Similarly to the SANU memorandum, the students’ text places Kosovo at the centre of Serbian national identity, emphasising Orthodox religious and cultural heritage sites, while largely ignoring the political realities that have existed since the 1999 war, the withdrawal of Serbian forces, and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008.
Moreover, Kremlin affiliated media outlets, known as the Pravda network, emphasised the narratives of Kosovo as central to “Serbian national identity” while a recent report by BIRN Kosovo found that Kremlin linked media spread misleading and politically charged content about Kosovo.
“A widely held view on Kosovo”
Flag depicting Kosovo as part of Serbia in the students protests in Serbia on October 30, 2025. Photo: Screenshot/ Filološki Fakultet Blokada/Instagram
Experts argue that while the student’s so-called memorandum reflects popular opinion within Serbian society, which is also problematic and outdated.
Slobodan Georgiev, director of Serbia’s Nova News, told Prishtina Insight that the memorandum “largely reflects mainstream public opinion” in Serbia rather than an ideological radicalisation unique to the student movement.
“That position is rooted in the Serbian Constitution. The students otherwise advocate respect for the Constitution and the rule of law, so it would be difficult for them to take a different stance on this issue,” Georgiev stated.
Moreover, “five EU member states still do not recognise Kosovo’s independence, while China and Russia also oppose recognition. That remains Serbia’s strongest argument,” he added.
Still, Georgiev noted that liberal circles in Serbia view such “rhetoric as outdated and misguided. Those who support the government largely tried to ignore it, because this position taken by the students has the potential to unsettle voters who back the ruling authorities.”
For critics in Kosovo, however, the memorandum represents something more troubling: the re-emergence of a nationalist discourse many believed younger generations in Serbia were beginning to move beyond.
Prishtina-based sociologist and political analyst Artan Muhaxhiri described the text as “conceptually backward” and “completely incompatible with contemporary democratic political thought.”
“It sounds as if it was taken directly from the late 1980s, after a 40-year amnesia about everything that has happened in the region,” Muhaxhiri told Prishtina Insight.
According to him, the memorandum refers to the international community as an essential actor in “resolving the Kosovo issue,” while avoiding any mention of Kosovo’s political representatives.
For Georgiev, this is one of the document’s most important elements.
“In my opinion, that is the key passage to focus on,” he emphasised. “It shows that they understand the reality of the situation and recognise that any final settlement will ultimately emerge within the framework of international mediation and monitoring.”
Nationalist rhetoric for political gain
Students march with banners during a mass student-led anti-government rally in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 23, 2026. Photo: EPA/Andrej Cukic
Georgiev emphasised that the students’ nationalist rhetoric reflects the movement’s gradual transformation from civic protest into a political actor seeking broader electoral appeal.
“This movement is unusual because it decided to engage directly in politics,” he said, adding that the movement appears to be operating in “campaign mode.”
“Campaign experts have assessed that this move was politically smart because it appeals to voters on the other side of the political spectrum,” he added, while noting that, “support is not won by advocating only liberal or progressive ideas.”
In a separate interview, Muhaxhiri agreed. “The only minimal explanation for this rhetoric is that they see it as a way to attract nationalist voters ahead of possible early elections expected later this year,” he said.
However, he warned that the strategy could ultimately backfire. “The most likely outcome is that they will lose part of their current support base without gaining new nationalist voters,” Muhaxhiri explained.
For months, the protests gained legitimacy precisely because they focused on governance, corruption, and justice rather than identity politics. Their moral authority stemmed from a tragedy that symbolised institutional collapse rather than ethnic division.
“The Memorandum appeared like a political ghost, although some indications of this nature had already been given during their Vidovdan protest last year,” Muhaxhiri said.
St.Vitus’s day on June 28, also known as Vidovdan, is traditionally important for Serbs as the date when Ottoman forces defeated the medieval Serbian kingdom in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, which led to the loss of Serbian independence for more than four centuries.
Ethnic Serbs gather annually in Gazimestan, some 10 kilometres from Kosovo’s capital, Prishtina, to mark Vidovdan. In recent years, Kosovo Police have escorted participants to the police station for hate speech or symbols, including on clothing, that violate legal order by denying Kosovo’s sovereignty.
In 2025, 17 people were detained and then released in a regular procedure after singing and shouting “Kosovo is the heart of Serbia,” and “Kosovo is Serbia.”
Muhaxhiri emphasised that the recent memorandum “created direct associations with the infamous 1986 Serbian Academy project, because of the harshness of its rhetoric. Their starting point was human. Then came political demands and the transformation of popular anger into a political option.”
According to him, the Kosovo memorandum risks undermining the movement’s image as a progressive alternative to Serbia’s current political establishment.
“Public positions of this kind are disappointing for anyone in Serbia or internationally who believed in the emancipatory potential of the student movement,” he added.
Gregoriev stated that, “right now, it seems to me that ordinary Serbs and Albanians do not have major problems with one another, but that the governments in Belgrade and Prishtina simply cannot tolerate each other.”
The main test of political normality in Serbia, according to Muhaxhiri, is actually its relationship with Kosovo. “That is where the line between rational and irrational politics is most clearly defined.”
“If the students genuinely believe these ideas, then it suggests a profound misunderstanding of the society they claim they want to lead.”
Russian narratives echoed by regional media
Illustration: BIRN
Kremlin affiliated media, known as the Pravda network, alongside those in Serbia, amplified the students memorandum by framing it largely through Serbia’s domestic political dynamics and portraying it as the “key” instrument for voter mobilisation ahead of potential early elections. These articles were also translated and published on the Albanian-language website of Pravda.
Media outlets like Pravda and Russia Today emphasised the narratives that “Kosovo is central to Serbian national identity”, while a recent report by BIRN Kosovo found that Kremlin-linked media spread misleading and politically charged content about Kosovo.
The Pravda network, which operates websites and Telegram channels in several languages including Albanian and Serbian, highlighted claims that Kosovo remains a “powerful tool for voter mobilisation in Serbia.”
“The Kosovo issue is a hot topic in Serbian society and a powerful tool for mobilising voters,” one Pravda report in Albanian stated. It further added that the memorandum “could help the student movement attract public support ahead of possible early parliamentary elections.”
Separately, in a May 17 publication, Russia Today addressed criticism of the memorandum by pointing to what it described as inconsistencies in European political positions on Serbia’s constitution and Kosovo.
“Advocates of European values, it seems, always defend the Serbian Constitution, except when it is mentioned that it states that Kosovo and Metohija is an integral and inalienable part of Serbia,” RT wrote.
Vreme also published an article on the event with the headline citing students’ memorandum that without Kosovo “our code is meaningless.”
Meanwhile, the lead article stated: Kosovo is “not just a space, it is a component of Serbian national identity,” citing the students’ memorandum.
A BIRN Kosovo and Internews Kosova report, published on March 27, found that the Pravda network, which operates in 83 countries and publishes in dozens of languages, relies mostly on Telegram-based sources to produce articles for its Albanian-language platform. Between September 2025 and February 2026 alone, the outlet published 140 articles in Albanian, all of which used Telegram channels as primary sources.
The report maps the disinformation trail in Kosovo, taking four Kremlin-controlled media outlets as a sample, which produced 1,323 news items about Kosovo from September 2025 to February 2026. Data was also extracted from 150 online platforms and social media accounts in Kosovo, with over 20,000 suspicious links produced during this period. A total of 2,361 articles were selected for in-depth analysis.
Note: This material was produced with the support of the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Kosovo through funding from the Government of the United Kingdom; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the UK Government.